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Abstract—A redundant fog loop-based scheme is proposed to 
preserve the source node-location privacy and achieve energy 
efficiency through two important mechanisms in wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs). The first mechanism is to create fogs with loop 
paths. The second mechanism creates fogs in the real source node 
region as well as many interference fogs in other regions of the 
network. In addition, the fogs are dynamically changing, and the 
communication among fogs also forms the loop path. The 
simulation results show that for medium-scale networks, our 
scheme can improve the privacy security by 8 fold compared to 
the phantom routing scheme, whereas the energy efficiency can 
be improved by 4 fold.  
Keywords—wireless sensor networks, source-location privacy, 
redundant fog loop, performance optimization 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are composed of a large 
number of sensor nodes that communicate with each other 
through multi-hop wireless links [1, 2]. Sensor networks rely 
on a wireless communication medium for broadcasting, which 
can be eavesdropped easily [3]. Adversaries may use 
expensive radio transceivers to intercept the networks and 
make use of the message flow patterns to trace the source of 
messages by moving along the reversed path [4, 5, 6, 7], even 
if strong data encryption is utilized. However, this ability to 
intercept such messages has become an issue of concern 
because in certain critical situations, such as endangered 
species or a vehicle with military officers, the privacy of the 
object of interest is important, and the location information 
should not be disclosed for safety reasons [4-7]. 
In this paper, we propose a redundant fog loop-based 
scheme (RFL scheme) that has a good privacy-preserving 
ability and energy efficiency. The major contributions of this 
paper are as follows: 
• We propose a RFL scheme with strong privacy-
preserving ability. This scheme creates many 
interference branch paths as well as many redundant 
fogs, which make it difficult for adversaries to 
determine where the real source node is and thus 
improves the privacy-preserving ability by many fold. 
• The RFL scheme has high energy efficiency and 
lifetime performance. Through a detailed analysis of 
the energy consumption in the network, we use 
residual energy in non-hotspot regions to create more 
fake fogs. This step improves the network privacy 
status and optimizes the network energy resource 
utilization, hence maximizing the network lifetime. 
• The RFL scheme has also been subjected to extensive 
simulations using Omnet++ [8], and the simulation 
results further strengthen the validity of our proposed 
scheme. When compared with other approaches for 
medium-scale sensor networks, our scheme can 
improve the privacy security by 8-10 fold and the 
energy efficiency by more than 4 fold. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section II, the related work is reviewed. The system model is 
described in Section III. In Section IV, the details of the RFL 
scheme are presented. Section V offers an analysis and 
comparison of simulation results, and Section VI provides the 
conclusion and ideas for future work. 
II. RELATED WORK  
The privacy threats that exist for sensor networks can be 
broadly classified into two dimensions: (i) content-based 
privacy threats and (ii) context-based privacy threats [9]. 
Content-based threats are well understood [3] and are often 
addressed using cryptographic techniques. There are certain 
aspects of cryptographic techniques that cannot be widely 
used to solve context-based privacy threats [3, 9-11]. Context-
based privacy is more challenging [3]. One aspect of context 
that is important in several applications is the preservation of 
source location privacy. 
Many studies have addressed the preservation of source 
location privacy for WSNs [3, 4, 9-13]. The existing research 
can be divided into two categories based on adversary ability, 
namely, source location privacy-preserving protocols against 
local attacks [3, 6, 9-13] and source location privacy-
preserving protocols against global attacks [14-17]. The flow 
sensed by adversaries is relatively minimal under local attacks. 
For example, adversaries can only sense wireless 
communication within one hop. In a global attack, adversaries 
can sense wireless communication within the entire network; 
thus, the global attack has strong attacking ability. 
To withstand adversaries with global attack ability, [18] 
proposed the ConstRate protocol, which is based on the 
premise that all nodes in the entire network send data packets 
with a constant rate regardless of whether real data packets are 
received. This protocol effectively defends against global 
traffic analysis attacks, but the introduction of extensive 
pseudo-packets leads to a sharp decline in the network lifetime 
and an increase in the transport delay of actual data packets. 
As an enhancement, a proxy-based filtering protocol was 
proposed in [19], where a sensor node that serves as a proxy 
can filter out fake data packets, thereby reducing network 
traffic. Bicakci, Kemal et al. [16] proposed a filtering idea 
called the Optimal Filtering Scheme) to maximize the network 
lifetime and preserve event-unobservability against global 
eavesdroppers. Afterwards, [17] proposed a FitProbRate 
protocol which proved that, by adjusting the nodal data 
transmission rate, the source location privacy can be preserved 
and the transport delay can also be reduced. 
However, more recent research, such as [17-19], has 
demonstrated that there are certain limitations for global 
eavesdroppers. Because all nodes are sending a large number 
of fake packets, it will greatly increase the nodal energy 
consumption, reduce the network lifetime, increase the packet 
collision probability and reduce the efficiency of packet 
transmission, in addition to increasing network delay. [11] 
noted that it is difficult to be a global eavesdropper in practice. 
Moreover, if the adversary has global ability, it is difficult to 
preserve the source location privacy. Therefore, adversaries 
only have local ability in practice, and research in this area has 
more practical significance. 
For local eavesdroppers, [6] introduced the Panda-Hunter 
game model for source location privacy. In this model, a large 
number of sensor nodes are deployed to monitor the wild 
habits of animals, such as pandas. Once the behavior of the 
panda is monitored, the sensor node closest to the panda will 
transmit the observed results to the base station. The hunter 
watching near the sink can locate the source node by tracing it 
in reverse hop-by-hop, eventually capturing the panda.  
C. Ozturk et al. proposed a famous phantom routing 
protocol [11] to protect against eavesdropping attacks on the 
source location. However, the phantom node in the original 
proposed protocol is closer to the source node. As a result, the 
source location may still be easily found by the adversary. 
Both theoretical and practical results demonstrate that if the 
message is routed randomly for h hops, the message will 
largely be within h/5 hops away from the actual source. 
Several approaches have been proposed to solve this problem. 
[11] designed a directed walk through either a sector-based 
approach or hop-based approach to ensure the phantom node 
is as far from the actual source as possible, thereby reducing 
the threat to the source node when the adversary is traced to 
the phantom node. 
There is considerable research on privacy-preserving 
protocols based on phantom routing. Yun Li et al. [4] 
developed two-phase dynamic routing-based schemes to 
provide source-location privacy. The main idea is to route the 
message to a node away from the actual message source 
randomly and then forward the message to the sink node using 
single-path routing. 
The fake source idea was proposed to introduce more 
sources to the sensor network, which generates fake messages 
that are the same length as the real messages and encrypted as 
well so that an adversary cannot differentiate between the real 
and the fake message. In this scenario, it is expected that an 
adversary will be directed to a fake source [9], and the goal of 
privacy preservation is achieved. 
Recent research has taken further measures to confuse 
adversaries; for example, a situation in which a phantom node 
is near the sink is not sufficiently confusing. M. E. Mahmoud 
and X. Shen proposed a cloud-based privacy-preserving 
scheme [7]. This scheme generates several fake source nodes 
around the real source node, and all source nodes send data 
and have routing paths. Therefore, a complex “cloud” area is 
formed in certain regions, whereby adversaries feel trapped in 
the cloud and are unable to recognize the real source node. 
Hence, it has stronger privacy-preserving ability than phantom 
routing.  
In this paper, we are fully aware of the dynamics between 
energy consumption and network lifetime; thus, our goal is to 
not only preserve source node-privacy but also optimize 
network lifetime. We can fully use the remaining energy in 
non-hotspot regions to enhance the privacy-preserving ability 
without affecting network lifetime, thus maximizing network 
lifetime and greatly improving the preserving ability and 
energy efficiency. 
III. THE SYSTEM MODEL  
A. The System Model 
1)  Network model 
We make the following general assumptions about our 
network model:  
a) Our network model is similar to the explanatory 
Panda-Hunter Game introduced in [5, 6, 21]. In this Panda-
Hunter Game, a sensor network is deployed with nodal density 
ρ to continuously monitor activities and locations of the 
animals in a wild animal habitat. As soon as a panda is 
discovered [6, 11], the corresponding source node in the 
nearby area will observe and report data to the sink node 
periodically [9, 11, 13]. The sink and sensor nodes are 
stationary. The sensor nodes are resource-constrained devices 
with low battery power and computation capacity. 
b)  The observed targets are randomly distributed in the 
network, i.e., the probability of each sensor node monitoring 
the target is equal, and thus, the probability of generating data 
to the sink is equal. 
c) We consider that a security infrastructure, such as 
secure communication, has been built in. That is, no 
information carried in the message (e.g., packet head) will be 
disclosed. The key management, including key generation, 
key distribution and key update, is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, interested readers are referred to such 
references as [3, 13]. 
2)  The Adversary Model 
Because of the high profits related to panda hunting, 
adversaries would try their best to equip themselves with 
advanced equipment, which means that they would have some 
technical advantages over the sensor nodes [5]. In this paper, 
the adversaries are considered to have the following 
characteristics: 
a) The adversaries have sufficient energy resources, 
computation capability and memory for data storage [6, 11, 
12, 13]. The adversary observes the wireless communication 
within a certain detection range. Upon detecting an event, they 
could determine the immediate sender by analyzing the 
strength and direction of the signal they receive. They can 
move to this sender’s location without any delay. We also 
consider that the adversaries will never miss any event when 
the node sent packet is in the communication radius of 
adversaries. 
b) The adversaries (such as hunters) are intelligent. 
They eavesdrop on the wireless transmissions and attempt to 
make use of the network traffic to determine the locations of 
pandas to hunt them. However, they cannot monitor the traffic 
of the entire network. 
c) The adversaries will not interfere with the proper 
functioning of the network, such as modifying packets, 
altering the routing path, or destroying sensor devices, as such 
activities can be easily identified [12, 13]. However, the 
adversaries may carry out passive attacks, such as 
eavesdropping of the communications. 
TABLE I.  NETWORK PARAMETERS 
B. Energy Consumption Model and Related Definitions 
In this paper, we adopt the typical energy consumption 
model in [13, 21], where the transmission energy consumption 
tE  follows Eq. 1 and energy consumption rE  for receiving 
follows Eq. 2. 
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where elecE  represents the transmission of circuit loss. 
Both the free space ( 2d  power loss) and the multi-path fading 
( 4d  power loss) channel models are used. If the transmission 
distance is less than the threshold 0d , the power amplifier loss 
is based on the free-space model; in the opposite case, the 
multi-path attenuation model is used. fsε  and ampε  are the 
energy required by power amplification in the two models. l  
is the number of bits in a packet. The above parameter settings 
are given in Table 1, as adopted from [13, 21, 22]. 
IV. RFL SCHEME DESIGN  
A. Overview of the Proposed Scheme 
The overall structure of the RFL scheme proposed in this 
paper is composed of two main parts: (1) fogs with branches, 
which serve as routing paths within and around fogs, and (2) 
the larger loop routing path among fogs leading to the sink. 
This novel structure gives our RFL scheme good privacy-
preserving ability and network lifetime, as discussed below. 
1) The RFL scheme achieves good privacy-preserving 
ability through two key components. 
Fig. 1. Illustration of RFL-based routing 
a) The fog: multiple branch routing paths are generated 
within the fog, but only the routing path branch with the 
source node sends real data; the other branches are 
interference. All branches route away from the fog center and 
generate routing branches continuously. All branches gather in 
a circular routing loop called the fog. In such a structure, the 
adversary traces back to the fog and finds that there are many 
branch paths, which is similar to entering into a fog area, and 
the real source path cannot be distinguished. Therefore, we 
call it the fog area. Unlike previous studies, this paper not only 
creates fog where the real source node is but also creates 
multiple fogs where there is no real source node. Most of the 
proposed approaches only seek to create interference routings 
in the area where the real source node resides to confuse the 
adversary. Some good examples are the famous phantom 
routing [6] and the cloud-based scheme that only creates a 
cloud around the source node [7]. In this paper, we refer to the 
scheme that sends data to the sink with a traditional routing 
strategy (such as the shortest route) as a near-source 
interference scheme because it only creates interference 
routing around the real source node. The drawback of this type 
of scheme is that the adversary can approximately compute the 
range of a real source node when it traces to the phantom node 
or the cloud, which can pose a great threat to the protected 
object. However, in this paper, as shown in Fig. 1, the RFL 
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scheme creates interference fogs both in the real source node 
and other non-source node vicinities. For example, in Fig. 1, 
fogs A, B, C, D are created. Because they are connected via 
each other, the source node can be located in any of them. 
Thus, if the same attack method is adopted, the probability of 
the source node being attacked with our scheme is only 1/4 of 
that with phantom routing or a cloud-based routing scheme. In 
other words, our RFL scheme improves the privacy-preserving 
ability by 4 fold. 
b) The loop routing: This is another important 
component for improving the ability to preserve privacy. 
There are two types of loop routings. One is around fog 
peripherals. The benefit of this type of loop routing is that it is 
effortless and easy for adversaries to discover and trace back. 
Hence, it is more likely to mislead adversaries only to be 
trapped in a routing loop along fog peripherals. Thus, the 
probability of an adversary gaining access to the fog is 
minimal, which can dramatically reduce the probability of 
discovering the source node. This type of loop routing 
provides the local source-location privacy. The other type of 
loop routing is routing among fogs. When the adversary traces 
back from the sink, it can easily be trapped into the larger 
routing loops among fogs. As shown in Fig. 1, when the 
adversary traces back from the sink along ①, which is marked 
by a red arrow, it can be easily entered into the routing loop 
among fogs along the route ②→③→④→⑤→② or the 
routing loop route ⑥→④→⑤→⑥. In addition, the following 
two reasons pose great difficulty for the adversary. The first 
reason is that it takes a long time for the adversary to return 
back to the paths that have already been traced because of 
longer loop routing among fogs; at worse, it may never even 
realize the path, consequently making it difficult to infer the 
region of the real source node. The other reason is that fogs 
are dynamically generated, and they disappear after some 
time. Therefore, after a period of trace time, the original 
routing loop is completely replaced by a new one. Thus, it 
always appears as a non-repeating and non-terminating path 
for the adversary. In other words, if the dynamical fog creation 
time is shorter than the time required for an adversary to trace 
back a loop, the adversary will encounter new routing loops 
unabated. This offers network-level source-location privacy. 
2) The RFL scheme achieves energy efficiency and 
network lifetime optimization through the following 
mechanism.  
Nodes in WSNs are simple and inexpensive with limited 
energy. Preserving privacy is achieved at the cost of increased 
energy expenditures. For example, all of the network nodes 
broadcast regularly in the privacy-preserving scheme proposed 
by [15, 16]. Although it has stronger privacy-preserving 
ability against a global attack, its larger energy consumption 
decreases network lifetime greatly and makes it impractical. In 
contrast, when privacy preservation is not considered, the 
routing protocols have a high network lifetime but are 
insecure. For instance, in phantom routing, privacy is achieved 
by generating a phantom node around the source node, and in 
cloud-based routing, privacy is improved by creating more 
fake source node clouds. These approaches deplete a certain 
amount of energy in generating phantoms and creating fake 
source clouds to enhance privacy, thus reducing the network 
lifetime. Unlike previous studies, the RFL scheme in this 
paper has the same lifetime as a normal unprotected routing 
protocol but possesses a stronger privacy-preserving ability 
than current secured schemes, as the area near the sink in 
WSNs is a hotspot region and the lifetime of an entire network 
is determined by the node lifetime of a hotspot region. In 
contrast, more than 90% of the node energy remains unutilized 
in non-hotspot areas after the network dies [13, 21]. Thus, 
redundant fogs and routings loops are created in the non-
hotspot region for preserving the source node privacy of the 
network. The hotspot receives only real data from the non-
hotspot region for transmission to the sink without any fogs 
created, and thus, there is no further energy burden on the 
hotspots. Therefore, the network lifetime in our scheme is 
optimal. Our scheme fully uses the energy of the non-hotspot 
region such that when the network dies, nearly all of the 
energy of the entire network is fully utilized, thus enhancing 
energy efficiency. 
B. Construction of a Single Fog  
Fig. 2. Construction of a single fog 
Fog is the basic unit composition of the RFL scheme; its 
structure is shown in Fig. 2. The end node 1C  after random 
walk ς  hops of source node S  is the fog center. There are 
two reasons why the sensor node S  is not at the center of the 
fog: (a) The source node at the center can be easily inferred by 
the adversary, making it vulnerable to attacks. (b) Through a 
random walk mechanism, although the adversary may know 
the algorithm of this paper, it cannot estimate the distance 
from the source node to the fog center or the approximate 
location of the source node. When 1C  is certain, 1σ  branch 
routing paths are issued uniformly away from 1C , and then, 
each routing path branch issues 2σ  routing paths; this process 
is continued until the hops from the fog center to the current 
node are δ . Then, connect all leaf nodes whose hops to the 
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fog center are δ . The detailed process is as follows. First, 1C  
is the end point where source node S  randomly walks ς  
hops; set 1C  as the center. 1C  selects 1σ  neighbor nodes as 
the first layer of branch routing paths (nodes A, B, and C in 
Fig. 2); these 1σ  nodes must be uniformly distributed; that is, 
consider the angle to 1C  to be 1 12 /α π σ= ; 1C  selects a 
neighbor node randomly, for example, node A in Fig. 2, and 
then selects one node at each 1α  degree direction, such as 
nodes B and C in the figure. Each node in the first layer 
selects 2σ  neighbor nodes in the same manner as 1C ; 
similarly, these 2σ  nodes must be distributed uniformly, and 
the angle between these 2σ  nodes can be calculated as 
2 1 22 / ( )α π σ σ= . Similarly, each node in the second layer 
selects 2σ  nodes as the third layer of the fog, and the branch 
routing path generation is completed until the δ th layer node 
is selected. Nodes in the outermost layer ( δ th layer) are 
called leaf nodes; after the leaf nodes are selected, connect 
them, and then the routing loop paths are completed, and thus, 
the construction of the entire fog is finished. 
C. Construction of Multiple Fogs and Formation of Loop 
Routing Paths among Fogs 
This section mainly discusses how to create multiple fogs 
after the construction of a single fog. The selection of multiple 
fogs must meet the following principles: (1) The created fogs 
must balance the network energy consumption to enhance 
energy efficiency and optimize network lifetime. (2) The 
location of these fogs must be diverse and random such that 
the adversary cannot infer fog in which the real source node is 
located. 
First, the selection of a fog location must be determined by 
energy consumption to achieve balanced energy consumption. 
Because energy consumption varies considerably in different 
regions of the network, the energy consumption can be 
balanced when the rate of creating fogs is proportional to the 
remaining energy. 
Consider the probability of selecting these 1ϑ − locations 
to be 1 2 1{ , ,... }ϑω ω ω ω −= . These locations indicate how far 
away from the sink the fogs should be created. For any 
selected location iϖ , nodes on the circumference of iϖ  from 
the sink meet the requirements. Therefore, it is flexible for the 
RFL to select the fog center, which makes the fogs diverse and 
random. The process of creating fogs is as follows. 
As shown in Fig. 3, 1C  is the center of the fog where the 
source node is located; given its connection to the sink, 1C S  is 
the Y axis, and the vertical direction of 1C S  is the X axis. Sort 
1 2 1{ , ,... }ϑω ω ω −  as 1 2 1{ , ,... }ϑυ υ υ −  according to 1.C h  ( 1.C h  is 
the distance from 1C  to the sink). Construct the first fog on the 
right side of this fog, and select an angle 'α  randomly from 
1 2[ , ]α α . If 1 1.C hυ > , then 'α  is an angle in the first quadrant 
and in a counterclockwise direction to the X axis. If 1 1.C hυ < , 
then 'α  is an angle in the fourth quadrant and in a clockwise 
direction to the X axis. Start from the 'α  direction, and route 
forward until the distance from the current routing node to the 
sink is 1υ ; set this point as the new fog center, namely, node 
2C  in the figure, and then construct the fog as described in the 
previous section. Similarly, construct the fog on the right side 
of the source node; that is, randomly select an angle ''α  from 
1 2[ , ]α α  (see in Fig. 3) and route along this direction to the fog 
center until point 3C  is reached, and the distance from 3C  to 
the sink is 2υ ; then, construct the second fog. The third fog 
starts from the center of the fog where the source node is; 
construct a fog until route 4C  is reached. The construction 
principle of subsequent fogs can be described as follows. (a) 
To the right, construct a fog on the rightmost of the fogs 
already constructed, such as fog 5 in Fig. 3; (b) then, to the 
left, construct a fog on the leftmost of fogs; (c) then, construct 
fogs starting from the non-outermost fogs; (d) repeat (a) and 
(c) until the number of constructed fogs is 1ϑ − . 
Fig. 3. Selection of fog centers 
The routing loops among fogs are formed as follows. First, 
start from the rightmost fog of the source node, select the 
nearest fog according to the right-hand rule, connect the first 
found fog with the shortest routing strategy, and then find the 
next fog forward in the same manner. Repeat this process until 
a larger routing loop is formed by connecting all fogs. To 
increase the complexity of the routing loops, randomly select 
two fogs and connect them with the shortest routing strategy 
(from the fog away from the sink to the fog near the sink). 
Finally, select a node dynamically and randomly from the 
routing path near to the sink and route it to the sink with the 
shortest routing (for security, selection in this manner can 
make the shortest routing to the sink vary considerably, which 
can confuse the adversary and disperse node flow to enhance 
the ability against hotspot attacks). The final network structure 
is shown in Fig. 1. 
D. Routing protocol of RFL 
We have discussed the network structure of the RFL 
scheme, and the routing protocol of RFL is described below. 
1) The routing protocol within fogs (for example, the 
source node fog). The protocol starts from the fog center 1C , 
1C  routes to nodes in the first layer, and when the data are 
received, each node pauses for a random period of time τ . 
Data are then sent from nodes in the first layer to nodes in the 
second layer, and finally, all data are sent to the routing loop 
around the fog. During this process, if nodes receive real data, 
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the fake data will be discarded, and only real data are sent to 
the sink. 
2) The routing protocol of loop routing. Nodes in the 
routing loop send data according to the following rule: If no 
real data are received during the data transmission cycle, one 
dummy message will be generated and stored. However, if 
real data are received, then fake data are discarded and the 
real data are stored. In terms of the data transmission time, 
the stored data are sent to the next route node; the routing 
direction is similar to the fog construction method in the 
previous section. 
3) The data transmission protocol of real source node S . 
Node S  randomly selects one node 1p  nearby, as shown in 
Fig. 2, and then sends data to the sink via the access point 1p ; 
after a period of time, it selects another access point 2p , 
continues in this manner, and selects 3p , 4p . When these 
access points receive real data, they will send real data 
forward within a predetermined period of time. 
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SIMULATION RESULTS AND 
PERFORMANCE 
OMNET++ is used for simulation verification. OMNET++ 
is an open network simulation platform that provides open 
source, component-based, modular simulation platform for 
large networks; it has been widely recognized by academics 
[8]. Without special instructions, the simulation scene is set as 
follows: 4,000 nodes are deployed in the simulations, the 
network radius is set to 600R = and the node of 
communication radius r  is 40. Some simulation parameters 
are as follows: 4ϑ = , 5δ = , 1 3σ = , 2 2σ = .  
A. Energy and network lifetime 
Fig. 4 is a screenshot of the simulation results after 
implementing the RFL scheme. As shown in Fig. 4, the 
simulation results demonstrate the successful implementation 
of the RFL strategy proposed in this paper. To allow for a 
sufficient simulation comparison, we implemented the 
phantom route and a protocol that only constructs one fog near 
the source, which represents the near source interference 
policy (NSIP), such as the cloud-based protocol [7]. Fig. 5 
shows the energy consumption under the phantom route, NSIP 
and RFL. The simulation setup is as follows: First, randomly 
select 200 source nodes, and execute the following three 
instructions for each node: (A) The source collects data 
according to the phantom route; (B) Construct only one fog 
around the source; and (C) Construct ϑ =4 fogs according to 
the RFL. After 10 rounds of data collection for one source 
node, change to another source and repeat the same process 
until all 200 nodes have been routed 10 times according to 
these three policies; finally, calculate the energy consumption. 
The results are shown in Fig. 5; under the phantom route, the 
energy consumption near the sink is extremely high, whereas 
it is low away from the sink, which shows that the energy 
efficiency is not high for regions with a significant amount of 
energy remaining. However, in the RFL scheme, the energy 
consumption away from the sink is high as well; in addition, 
this will not affect the network lifetime because the energy 
consumption of the far away regions is not higher than the 
hotspots. In this manner, there is only one route to the sink 
through the hotspots near the sink, and we construct as many 
interference routes as possible by fully using the remaining 
energy in regions away from the sink. In the NSIP scheme, the 
energy consumption in the non-hotspot area is higher than that 
in the phantom route, but there is still considerable energy 
remaining compared with our RFL scheme; the energy 
consumption is balanced when 4ϑ = . The results in Fig. 5 
indicate that although our scheme constructs many 
interference fogs and branch routes, it has improved the 
energy efficiency greatly without affecting network lifetime. 
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Fig. 4. Simulation screenshot in 
the RFL scheme 
Fig. 5. Energy consumption under 
different source privacy schemes 
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Fig. 8. Energy consumption under the 
loop fog route 
Fig. 9. Energy remaining under 
different policies 
Figs. 6, 7 and 8 show the three-dimensional map of energy 
consumption under the phantom route, NSIP and RFL, 
respectively, with 4ϑ = . As shown in Fig. 6, under the 
phantom route, the energy consumption near the sink is high, 
and there is significant energy remaining in regions away from 
the sink (the left energy ratio is supposed to be 90% in [9]). 
Under NSIP, the energy consumption in the non-hotspot area 
increases, but there is still considerable energy remaining. 
Under the RFL with 4ϑ = , the energy consumption is 
balanced in different regions, and thus, the network energy is 
fully used with a relatively high energy efficiency.  
Fig. 6. Energy consumption under the 
phantom route 
Fig. 7. Energy consumption under 
the loop fog route with one fog 
Fig. 9 compares the energy remaining among RFL, NSIP 
and the phantom route. The energy consumption under RFL is 
nearly balanced for the entire network. The remaining energy 
ratio is approximately 20% when the network dies, which is 
relatively low. Under phantom route, because the energy 
consumption near the sink is much higher than other regions, 
the percentage of energy remaining is as high as 80% when 
the network dies, which is much higher. Under NSIP, the 
percentage of remaining energy is also as high as 60%. As 
seen from the simulation results, by selecting the appropriate 
parameters and number of fogs, the energy can be effectively 
utilized in RFL, which improves the energy efficiency by 4 
fold compared to the other policies. 
B. Security performance 
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the route 
length under different policies with 
different R values 
Fig. 11. Improvement as a result of 
RFL 
Fig. 10 compares the route lengths between RFL, NSIP 
and the phantom route under different network scales of R . 
Fig. 10 illustrates that the total route length is approximately 
500 hops under RFL, 100 hops under NSIP and only 10 hops 
under the phantom route. Fig. 11 shows the ratio for the length 
of RFL against NSIP and the phantom route. The total routing 
path length of RFL is approximately 33.79 to 46.68 fold higher 
than that of the phantom route and 5.59 to 8.07 fold higher 
than that of NSIP. The previous analysis demonstrates that a 
longer route length makes it more difficult for the adversary to 
trace to the source. Thus, the route length refers to the ability 
to protect against attacks, and a longer route length implies 
higher security. The simulation results in Figs. 10 and 11 show 
that the security performance of RFL is more than 5-fold 
better than NSIP and the phantom route. 
Next, the program simulates the performance of an 
adversary attack under RFL, NSIP and the phantom route; the 
simulation scenario in Fig. 12 is similar to the one shown in 
Fig. 4. There is only one adversary in our simulation. The 
adversary waits near the sink and traces back once the data 
have been detected. Because the adversary cannot determine 
the actual direction of the source, when there are multiple 
source directions, the adversary will randomly select one 
direction to trace back. If it reaches the end of the path, which 
infers an unsuccessful attack, the adversary will turn back to 
the last branch and trace back along another branch and repeat 
this process until it reaches the pre-set attack hops. Then, we 
calculate the success probability (the statistical results). In 
addition, we view the adversary as highly intelligent and can 
return to the last un-traced route to continue the next attack 
without time cost; namely, the adversary can trace back with 
no cost in time or tracing. The simulation is repeated 200 
times, and statistical results are obtained. Fig. 12 illustrates 
that under the phantom route, the success probability of an 
attack can reach 100% when the number of hops traced is less 
than 20; under NSIP, it can be 100% when 50 hops are traced, 
whereas under RFL, the probability of a successful attack is 
less than 50% when the number of hops traced reaches 100, 
which shows that RFL improves the ability to protect against 
attacks by more than 8 fold. 
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Fig. 12. Success probability with 
different trace hops 
Fig. 13. Trace hops under a success 
probability of 50% for different R 
Fig. 13 shows the traced hops for a success probability of 
50% under different values of R . Two conclusions can be 
drawn from Fig. 13. (1) Under different R , in the RFL 
scheme, the number of hops traced is 5 fold greater when the 
success probability reaches 50%, which demonstrates that 
RFL has a stronger ability to protect against attacks than other 
policies. (2) As R  grows, the number of traced hops increases 
rapidly, whereas in other policies, it increases slowly, which 
shows that a larger network scale yields a higher security 
performance in RFL, and RFL clearly has stronger scalability. 
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static and dynamic fogs 
Fig. 15. Average trace length under 
different change ratios 
Another feature that makes RFL superior to existing 
privacy-preserving policies against traceback attacks is that in 
RFL, multi-fogs are constructed regardless of whether the 
source is moving, and fogs are dynamically changing and 
moving. Therefore, when the adversary traces back, it always 
traces to the un-traced routes, which is equivalent to an 
increase in the average trace length; thus, it is more difficult 
for the adversary to trace to the source. Fig. 14 shows the 
average trace length in the situation in which one fog is 
revoked and a new fog is constructed once data collection is 
processed for 30 rounds. As shown in Fig. 14, the RFL with 
the dynamic scheme has a longer trace length than other 
policies, which indicates a better performance by RFL. Fig. 15 
shows the relationship between the average route length and 
fog changing rate. With data collection ranging from every 50 
rounds to every 10 rounds, as the fog area changes more 
rapidly, the average trace length becomes longer, indicating an 
improved security performance. However, because of the 
energy consumption and routing rebuilding costs, dynamic 
changing requires trade-off optimization between security and 
costs. Because other policies do not have this feature, their 
privacy-preserving ability is relatively weak. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a redundant fogs loop 
(RFL) scheme for preserving source-location privacy and 
optimizing energy utilization which maximizes both the 
network security and lifetime. The RFL scheme constructs 
multi-fogs by fully using extra energy in non-hotspot regions. 
Each fog creates multiple fake packets around the source 
node, which provides local source-location privacy. Besides 
fogs are connected by routing loops and thus it offers global-
level source-location privacy. At the same time, RFL enhances 
the security by dynamically constructing and revoking fogs, 
which improves energy efficiency by more than 5 times, and 
also maximize network security without decreasing the 
lifetime of WSNs. 
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